At the hearing on the motions, counsel for the defendant argued that (1) because the plaintiff suffered no direct injury as a result of the defendant's alleged failure to comply with the item pricing regulation in its Quincy store, he lacked standing to sue and (2) the District Court lacked authority to enter an injunction enforcing the item pricing regulation.Ī judge in the Quincy District Court concluded, based on Purity Supreme, Inc. 218, § 24.Īfter transfer, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the defendant moved to dismiss the case. The defendant transferred the case to the regular civil docket of the Quincy District Court. 218, § 21, and court costs, see Rule 7 (e) of the Uniform Small Claims Rules (2001). He also alleged that he had sent the defendant an appropriate demand letter, but "to no avail." The plaintiff sought the limit in small claim damages, $2,000, see G. 93A, § 2 (a), by "refus to place prices directly on the merchandise that it offers for sale" in its Quincy store in violation of 940 Code Mass. The plaintiff, pro se, alleged that the defendant had engaged in unfair and deceptive consumer practices, within the meaning of G. This case began as a small claim action in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department. We also conclude that the Appellate Division of the District Court (Appellate Division) was the appropriate tribunal to decide the defendant's appeal. We conclude that the District Court judge in this case had the authority to grant the plaintiff injunctive relief under G. Gilman for Retailers Association of Massachusetts. Szafarowicz, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.Ĭarl Valvo & Gregory S. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate review.īeth I. On transfer from the small claims session to the regular civil session, the case was heard by Mark S. ĬIVIL ACTION commenced in the small claims session of the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on December 1, 1999. 3, to the District Court in Norfolk and Middlesex counties. 3.13 (1)(a) (1993) in one of its stores in Norfolk County, where the Appellate Division, as part of the District Court Department, had the same equitable jurisdiction extended to it in the performance of its duties as was granted by St. 9, directing the defendant to comply with the item pricing regulation contained in 940 Code Mass. The Appellate Division of the District Court Department was theĪppropriate tribunal to decide the appeal of a defendant against which injunctive relief had been granted under G. 3, conferred equity power on the District Court in Norfolk and Middlesex counties. 9 (3A), did not expressly prohibit a District Court judge from exercising equity power in a consumer protection case and where St. 3.13 (1)(a) (1993) in one of its stores in Norfolk County, where the plaintiff's action was not solely equitable in nature but also sought money damages where c. District Court, Jurisdiction, Appellate Division.Ī District Court judge had the authority to grant a plaintiff Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.Ĭonsumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act.
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